Johnsonfinancialgroup.authorization.es Reports & Reviews (1)
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SCAMPULSE
Scammer's website johnsonfinancialgroup.authorization.es
Country United States
Victim Location WI 53217, USA
Type of a scam Bank/Credit Card Company Imposter
Milwaukee Jewish Free Loan Association (MJFLA)
Anna Koenig – Executive Director
Anna received a call from a number she had saved on her work phone as Johnson Bank – number listed as 888-769-3796. The first call came in at 1:45 pm. The phone call lasted 25 minutes and 35 seconds.
“Carl” from Johnson Bank contacted Anna regarding two outgoing wire transfers to Michael Smith, totaling $140,000, which appeared fraudulent.
Anna confirmed that these transactions were unauthorized by her or her coworker.
Carl requested Anna to provide a phone number for authentication purposes, which she did. (Anna provided her cell, 224-330-7663).
Carl reassured Anna bout FDIC insurance coverage for unauthorized charges.
Carl asked who our personal banker was. Anna explained that we work with Sue Runkel. Carl asked if Sue had attempted to contact Anna about the wire transfer. Anna explained that she had not. Carl stated that he was surprised that Sue had not tried to contact Anna about the wire transfer, as with our account type, we would need to physically go into a branch to complete the transaction.
Carl asked Anna about the last time she spoke to Sue. Anna explained that she had gone in person at the end of March to speak with Sue about some bank charges that occurred, and then they had emailed about these bank charges at the beginning of April, along with the new account type that they had.
Carl asked Anna to confirm the city and Zip Code of the bank branch we go to, which Anna provided. Carl asked the names of the other signers on the account, which she explained was Leo, our treasurer, and he also asked his last name later on in the conversation.
Carl explained that Sue was under investigation for fraud and that we should not speak with her about the wire transfer. He shared that they were looking into a few “bad apples” who were part of a scheme and that they did not want to tip them off, as they wanted to catch them in the act. Carl said that Sue had been under investigation for 30 days, and her security clearances had been lowered.
Carl explained that whoever initiated the wire transfer was in our account, and had turned off notifications, which is why we were not receiving any notifications about this activity. He explained that he would turn back on the notifications, and we received 5 notifications regarding bank activities. (See attached screenshots).
Carl had Anna type in “*728056264156” from her work phone at 2:05 pm.
Anna was prompted to log in to the Johnson Financial Group’s secure authentication link for further verification.
Anna logged onto the link provided – johnsonfinancialgroup.authorization.es (see attached screenshot).
The website stated “An Extra layer of security is required. Please enter the verification code sent to your device.”
Anna typed in the verification codes that had been sent to her phone.
Anna did the same with Debbie’s login credentials but did not share the login credentials with the fraudsters, rather she typed them into the website.
Carl and Anna were then on the line at 2:12 pm for 1 hour and 20 minutes. During this time, Debbie went to the bank to make some deposits.
Carl asked Anna to confirm the last two deposits that occurred in the account, which Anna did confirm ($50 to one account, $100 to another account). Carl asked if anyone had been at the branch that day talking about the fraud, to which Anna answered yes, because Debbie Scribner, MJFLA’s Administrative Coordinator, had gone in and made deposits. The banker at the branch experienced some issues in getting one of the checks to scan, and Debbie mentioned that we were dealing with some fraudulent issues while she was at the bank. Carl reiterated that we should not speak to anyone at the branch about the fraudulent activity, as there were several people under investigation.
At 3 pm, Sue Runkel called the office number 414-961-1500. Anna was on the phone with the fraudsters at this time, and they explained that the call was a test call, and not to answer it. Sue left a message stating “Anna, this is Sue calling from Johnson Financial Group. I have a person that is saying that they are you on the phone that wants to initiate a wire? I do not believe that it is you, but I just wanted to make sure that is why I am calling if you could give me a call back as soon as possible. That would be great. Thank you.” Sue also called Anna’s cell phone twice during this time, along with Debbie’s extension, but Anna never received these phone calls as her phone calls from her cell phone were being forwarded.
Carl instructed Anna not to answer the call and explained that it was a test. Carl provided Anna with his “back office” number so that she could contact him directly – the number he provided was 805-223-5566.
At 3:28 pm Carl set up Anna with a “24-hour live chat” so that she could speak with a representative at any time while dealing with this issue. The live chat texted her from 608-215-3203. They instructed her to type back “Ok” once she received the text, which Anna did. (See attached screenshots).
At 3:51 pm, Anna received a text from the Johnson Bank Live Chat stating, “Please contact Carl’s back-office number.”
Anna called the back-office number at 3:52 pm. At this time, he transferred Anna to “Jake”, a senior supervisor at Johnson Bank. Jake shared with Anna the next steps that needed to happen. Jake asked Anna if she could get to a Johnson Bank branch that day. Anna explained that she was currently in Illinois, but that she could go to a branch tomorrow. Jake explained that they would set up a call in the morning, but that Anna should go to a Johnson Bank branch that she had never gone to before (to not tip off Sue) and that she should switch their account from a MyJFG account to an Access JFG account. He explained that the banker may try to convince me to stay with the MyJFG account, but we would not be charged any fees to go to the Access JFG account type. He asked me to document the names of the people I was speaking with to identify compromised people. He explained that MyJFG is not as secure and that we want to get the Access JFG account regardless of the fees. He said if the banker questions why we want to change, Anna should explain that “at this very moment, I’m having an issue with my personal banker that I do not wish to discuss.” Jake asked Anna to contact him when this is set up so that ACH and Wire payment options can be securely made. He reiterated that I should not discuss any personal details while in the branch regarding the investigation and that Anna should contact Carl to get transferred over to speak with Jake directly.
Anna had been in touch with her treasurer, Leo, throughout the afternoon about what was going on. Anna called Leo again at 4:07 pm, explaining that she had a few more updates to fill him in on. Leo attempted to call Anna back at 4:08 pm and texted her that he just tried to call her back. Leo explained that the phone rang, but it said the voicemail box was not set up. It was at this point that Anna realized something might be going on with her phone, and the situation may be suspicious. Anna had her mother-in-law attempt to call her, and it did not go through. At 5:40 pm Anna texted the LiveChat and asked if someone could give her a call. “Jake” responded and asked her to give him a call and explained that he was calling, but there was no response. Anna explained that her phone was not working for some reason and then called the number (608-214-3203). Anna asked them to confirm how she knew they were telling the truth and were actually from Johson Bank, to which they explained that they called from the Johnson Bank number (which appeared to be true), and that they had asked me to go into a branch, and stated: “Why would we ask you to go into a branch if we weren’t from Johnson Bank?” Anna then attempted to contact the true Johnson Bank customer service line, but at this time the lines were closed.
Anna had her parents and brother-in-law attempt to call her as well, but no calls were coming through. This is when she realized that there was call-forwarding set up on her phone to the number 805-223-5566. Anna turned the call forwarding off and was able to receive calls again. At this point, Anna understood that the situation was fraudulent and decided to call the Johnson Bank customer service line first thing in the morning (8 am), call her branch as soon as they opened at 8:30 am, and then go in person to get everything sorted out.
May 13, 2025 – Anna received a text at 3:26 pm from the “Johnson Bank Live Chat” stating “It’s Supervisor Jake, by any chance did you have any discrepancies.”
Anna called the Johnson Financial Group customer support line, and they recommended she report the text and block the number.